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A salient feature of any given explanation is that it should have a 
certain modal force -- that it should be able to support the appropriate 
sorts of counterfactuals and subjunctive conditionals. And so it is with 
action explanation. Rationalizing explanations make essential use of the 
content of the agent's propositional attitudes. Thus if an agent desires 
that p and believes that, by doing A, p will be realized, the agent will 
perform A. If this familiar form of reasoning is to have any explanatory 
bite, then it must be able to support certain counterfactuals. We want to 
be able to say that if the agent didn't have the relevant beliefs and 
desires, he wouldn't have performed action A. 
Token physicalism purports to resolve the problem about psycho- 
physical causation by reducing it to the relatively unproblematic 
physical-physical causation. Thus a physical event Pl, which is token 
identical with a contentful mental event, causes a physical event P2, 
which is itself token identical with an intentional action. According to 
Davidson, a singular causal statement will be subsumed by some 
physical law relative to the appropriate descriptions. But the causal or 
nomological necessity attached to the singular causal statement in virtue 
of its nomic subsumption isn't sufficient to capture the appropriate 
counterfactuals required of our belief-desire explanations. I want to 
argue that if, as Davidson claims, rationalizing explanations are a 
species of causal explanation, then it isn't enough that the relevant 
propositional attitudes are token identical with the appropriate physical 
events, or even that the content of the relevant propositional attitudes 
"weakly supervene"1 on the physical state of the agent, but rather, in 
order to capture the modal force of folk psychological explanations, the 
relevant propositional attitudes must have their causal efficacy in virtue 
of their semantic content. That is to say that having semantic content, 
being a belief that p, must be a causally relevant property. If, on 
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Davidson's account, the content of the relevant propositional attitudes 
fail to be causally relevant to the production of the given intentional 
action, then, ipso facto, his notion of the mental is epiphenomenal. 2 I 
suspect that these considerations apply mutatis mutandis, to any given 
autonomist theory -- that the threat of epiphenomenalism is a general 
problem for any non-reductionist theory of content. 3 
C O U N T E R F A C T U A L S  A N D  E X P L A N A T I O N  
Davidson's project in "Actions, Reason's and Causes ''4 is to provide an 
analysis of the relation between a reason and an action in virtue of 
which the reason explains the action. He wants to provide an account of 
what makes rationalizing explanations adequate -- how is it that they 
explain anything at all? Davidson begins by drawing a distinction 
between an agent merely having a good reason to perform a given 
action and an agent having a "reason for which" the action was 
performed. A reason justifies the agent's action in terms of the semantic 
content of his propositional attitudes, i.e., his beliefs, fears, wishes, 
hopes, etc. An agent can have many reasons which justify a given 
action. For instance, one reason for going to bed would be that the 
agent believes that he needs ten hours of sleep a night and that he has 
to be up at a certain time. The agent may also be exhausted and thus 
desire sleep. However, he went to bed because he was exhausted and 
not because he ought to, the agent being in general irresponsible as 
to his morning appointments. Davidson claims that a given reason 
rationalizes, or explains, a given action when it is the reason for 
which the action was performed. Rationalizing explanations have their 
explanatory power by adverting to such reasons, i.e., rationalizing 
explanations are adequate just in case the reason cited is the reason for 
which the action was performed. 
To see this, simply consider offering as an explanation for the agent's 
going to bed that he believed that he needed the appropriate amount of 
sleep. Such an explanation would be inadequate since if he hadn't been 
exhausted, he wouldn't have gone to bed -- regardless of his belief that 
he ought to. It seems clear that such a reason doesn't adequately 
explain the agent's action since, in effect, it won't support the appro- 
priate sorts of counterfactuals and subjunctive conditionals. A neces- 
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sary condition for a given explanation to be adequate, then, is that it 
should support counterfactuals of the form: 
(1) If the agent hadn't had reason R, then he wouldn't have 
performed action A. 
Davidson wants to account for this distinction by proposing that a 
reason for which a given action is performed is the c a u s e  of the given 
action. Let's take a step back and unpack this suggestion. One principal 
difference between a reason and a reason for which is that the reason 
for which is a "determinant" of that action. A necessary condition for 
one event to be a determinant of another is that it should support 
counterfactuals of the form: 
(2) If event e I determines event e2, then if e I hadn't obtained, e2 
wouldn't have obtained. 
Without such a necessary condition one simply doesn't have an 
interesting notion of determination. Davidson's proposal is that in order  
to get the counterfactuals necessary for explanation, a reason must be a 
causal determinant of the given intentional action. The general strategy 
is to ground the counterfactuals needed for explanation in the modal 
properties characteristic of the class of determiner relations. 
As a matter of historical fact, given Davidson's extensional frame- 
work and his agnosticism towards counterfactuals, it probably isn't true 
that Davidson was worried about counterfactuals in drawing the 
distinction between a mere reason and a reason for which. In fact he 
only mentions counterfactuals as a standard move in distinguishing laws 
from contingent empirical generalizations. It is clear, however, that he 
saw the principal difference between the two as grounded in the fact 
that one was, and the other wasn't, a causal determinant of the given 
intentional action. The question which is crucially glossed in Davidson's 
account is why being a causal determinant is an interesting explanatory 
property. Thus the need to ground the appropriate counterfactuals 
remains tacit. I plead innocent to the charge of interpretive violence on 
the basis of the principle of charity - -  I simply don't  know how to make 
sense of Davidson's answer without unpacking counterfactuals and their 
role in explanation. 
Whether  or not my interpretation of Davidson's move is justified, 
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there are independent reasons for thinking that Davidson's account is 
only adequate if it can capture counterfactuals like (1) over and above 
the observation that explanations in general should have a certain 
modal force -- that supporting counterfactuals like (1) is in some sense 
constituitive of being explanatory. Recall that Davidson claims that 
rationalizing explanations are a species of causal explanation. It follows, 
then, that the propositional attitudes adverted to in a rationalizing 
explanation must be among the causal determinants of the given 
intentional action. 
Consider the following argument suggested by Dretske. 5 If proposi- 
tional attitudes are to be among the causal determinants of a given 
action, being a belief that p, having that semantic content as opposed to 
another, should be a causally relevant property. At least a necessary 
condition for being a causally relevant property can be spelled out in 
terms of being able to support the appropriate sorts of counterfactuals 
and subjunctive conditionals. In particular, causal relevance has the 
following counterfactual property: 
(3) If property P is causally relevant to event e 1 causing event e2, 
then if e 1 hadn't exemplified P, e 1 wouldn't have caused e 2. 
If the appropriate propositional attitudes having the content that they 
do is to be causally relevant to the production of the given action, then 
the semantic content of the pertinent attitudes should support ~ e  
appropriate counterfactuals. If they fail to do so, they/violate this 
necessary condition and thus aren't causally relevant. Since rationalizing 
explanations typically advert to the content of propositional attitudes as 
among the causal determinants of a given action, the semantic content 
of these attitudes must support the appropriate counterfactuals if one's 
intentional psychology is to be an adequate explanatory edifice, ff 
rationalizing explanations fail to do so on Davidson's account, then 
Davidson's notion of content is epiphenomenal. 
The above argument is valid. One might object, however, to its 
soundness without further qualifications. Someone might claim that 
Dretske has overlooked The Problem of Spurious Overdetermination, 
e.g., that there might be two mental events which are both indepen- 
dently causally sufficient for the production of a given action. Let m 1 
and m2 be two such events which cause the intentional action A. Since 
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ml and rn 2 are independently causally sufficient for A, counterfactuals 
of the form: 
(4) If m 1 hadn't obtained, A wouldn't have been performed 
might fail since at some nearby world where m~ fails to obtain, m 2 
obtains. Since rn 2 is causally sufficient for A, A will obtain while ml 
doesn't, thus falsifying the subjunctive conditional. It's important to note 
that this is a general problem --  that The Problem of Spurious Over- 
determination is not specific to mental causation, and belies, therefore, 
neither the soundness of Dretske's argument nor  the modal intuition 
behind it. 
It's important to note that Dretske's counterfactual condition is just a 
special case of the proposed necessary condition on the class of 
determiner relations. Recall that Davidson claims that only reasons 
which causally determine the given intentional action will be explana- 
torily adequate. I argued that what makes a mental event's being a 
determiner of a given action an explanatorily interesting property is that 
one can ground the counterfactuals needed for explanation in the 
necessary condition on determiner relations, i.e., that any member of 
the class of determiner relations should support counterfactuals of the 
form if event e 1 determines event e2, then if el hadn't obtained, e 2 
wouldn't have obtained. Given Davidson's base distinction, and given 
that my inference to the best explanation is correct, i.e., that you can't 
make sense of Davidson's proposal  without invoking counterfactuals, 
then Davidson is committed to (3). Thus if Davidson's theory fails 
to meet Dretske's condition, it is, on its own account explanatorily 
inadequate. 6 
D A V I D S O N '  C A U S A L  T H E O R Y  OF A C T I O N  
Davidson proposes that the explanatory relation that holds between a 
reason R an an intentional action A is fully specified by the justificatory 
relation and the appropriate causal relation. He holds, moreover,  that 
one only understands a given action explanation if one understands 
how to construct for it a primary reason. A primary reason is a 
coordinated pair of mental states consisting of a belief-state and a pro- 
attitude. A pro-attitude is a propositional attitude which expresses a 
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favorable attitude of the agent towards actions of a certain kind. Such 
pro-attitudes would include wants, desires, hopes, urges, etc. This then 
is Davidson's theory: 
(5) R is a primary reason why an agent performed the action A, 
under description D just in case 
(i) R consists of a pro-attitude of the agent towards 
actions with a certain property and a belief that A, 
under description D, has that property, and 
(ii) R bears the appropriate causal relation to A. 
The justificatory relation arises out of the semantic content of the 
relevant propositional attitudes. Justification is normative or evaluative 
in the sense that the intentional action must be reasonable in light of the 
agent's beliefs and desires. A given action is reasonable in light of the 
relevant belief desire pair in virtue of a piece of practical reasoning. 7 
More specifically, it is reasonable in virtue of the quasi-logical relation- 
ship that arises out of the semantic content to the appropriate proposi- 
tional attitudes. Davidson thinks that an intentional action expresses 
something like propositional content. This propositional content is an 
unconditional evaluative proposition that the agent's action is desirable. 
Davidson holds that the unconditional evaluative proposition is deter- 
mined by a non-deductive inference whose premisses are the appro- 
priate belief and pro-attitude. The content of a pro-attitude is a prima 
facie evaluative proposition that any act is desirable insofar as it is of a 
certain kind. The content of the pro-attitude thus concerns act-types. 
Since the unconditional evaluative proposition expressed by the inten- 
tional action is about an act-token, the belief premiss must itself be 
about an act-token. Specifically, the agent believes that this token of 
this act-type is also of the type specified by the pro-attitude. 8 Consider 
an agent who desires to soothe his nerves. He believes that this act of 
drinking a shot of whiskey will soothe his nerves, therefore this 
particular act of drinking a shot of whiskey is desirable. What's 
important for the purposes of this paper is simply that the justificatory 
relation is systematically related to the content of the agent's primary 
reason and the unconditional evaluative proposition expressed by the 
intentional action. 
It's important to note that the semantic content of the relevant 
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propositional attitudes, while necessary and sufficient for establishing 
the justificatory relation between the agent's coordinated belief-desire 
complex and the given intentional action, only provides a necessary 
condition for primary reason R to be a reason for which. In practical 
reasoning, the content of the belief and pro-attitude can have as their 
conclusion an unconditional evaluative proposition without the inten- 
tional action, which would express it, being performed by the agent. 
This is more or less the starting point of "Actions, Reasons, and 
Causes" and Davidson's paper on intending. 9 The semantic content of 
the agent's mental  state, while making a systematic contribution to the 
propositional content expressed by the act-token, is simply insufficient 
for actually producting the given intentional action. R must, in addition, 
bear the appropriate causal relation to A. The following is Davidson's 
analysis of a reason R being the cause of an action A : 
(6) A primary reason R is a cause of an action A just in case 
(i) R is token identical with physical event p~ and A is 
token identical with physical event P2, and 
(ii) Pl causes P2 where Pl and P2 are nomically subsumed 
by a strict physical law relative to descriptions D 1 and 
D2.  
Let's begin by looking at Davidson's views concerning laws and 
causal relations. In "Mental Events", l~ Davidson holds The Principle of 
the Nomological Character of Causality which states that events related 
as cause and effect are subsumed by strict laws. For Davidson, a law is 
a true lawlike sentence, where a sentence is lawlike if and only if it is a 
generalization confirmable by its positive instances and can support the 
appropriate counterfactuals and subjunctive conditionals. Sentences are 
what primarily instantiate laws. A given event is nomologically 
subsumed only by satisfying a certain description which itself instan- 
tiates a component of the law such as an antecedent or consequent. It is 
clear that Davidson holds the neo-Humean view that every true singular 
causal statement entails a law, but he argues that this doctrine is 
systematically ambiguous. On one reading, the singular causal statement 
entails a particular law. In action theory this would correspond to the 
Hempelian deductive-nomological model with its explicit use of cover- 
ing laws connecting attitudes with actions. ~l On the second reading, a 
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singular causal statement only entails the existence of some subsump- 
tive law. Thus to understand a causal explanation given in terms of 
a singular causal statement it isn't necessary to have any kind of 
epistemological access to the underlying strict physical law. 
This oblique view of causal explanation in conjunction with a 
physicalist notion of causation merges nicely with Davidson's token 
physicalism. Davidson embraces token physicalism as an attempt to 
resolve the problem about psycho-physical causation9 Thus a contentful 
mental event is causally efficacious by being token identical with a 
physical event. The idea is that a single event can instantiate both 
mental and physical types. Thus rationalizing explanations, which make 
essential use of propositional attitudes, entail the existence of some 
strict law. Davidson's picture seems to be this: 
R z] 
9 token identity 
Pl causes P2 
where reason R is token identical with physical event Pl (R --t Pl) and 
intentional action A is token identical with P2 (A =t P2) and Pl is 
causally sufficient for P2. "Pl causes P2" is subsumed by some strict 
physical law. 
Let's briefly sum up. According to Davidson's theory, the explana- 
tory relation "supervenes" on the justificatory relation and the appro- 
priate causal relation, where the justificatory relation arises in virtue of 
the semantic content of the relevant propositional attitudes. (6) gives 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a primary reason to be a cause 
of a given intentional action -- but the explanatory relation is supposed 
to be determined by the justificatory relation and the appropriate causal 
relation. Davidson never provides an analysis of this restriction, but 
what he has in mind is problems with wayward or deviant causal chains. 
T H E  C A U S A L  I R R E L E V A N C E  OF I N T E N T I O N A L  A S C R I P T I O N  
Is Davidson's account adequate to capture his base distinction between 
a mere reason and a reason for which? Does Davidson's machinery 
have enough apparatus to ground the counteffactuals he needs? 
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It's given that we want rationalizing explanations such as the belief- 
desire explanations typical of our vernacular psychology to support 
counterfactuals like (1). At this point I want to ask a metaphysical 
question: in virtue of what do rationalizing explanations have their 
modal force? Since Davidson gives necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the explanatory relation, if successful, they should entail counter- 
factuals like (1). In order for Davidson to provide a non-question 
begging answer to the metaphysical question he must appeal only to 
what appears on the right-hand side of the biconditional. This is an 
important restriction. For instance one couldn't take the following line. 
Causal explanations have the canonical form of a singular causal 
statement: 
(7) c caused e 
and in principle warrant the following counterfactual: 
(8) If c had not obtained, e wouldn't have obtained. 
Since rationalizing explanations are a species of causal explanation they 
should entail counterfactuals like (1). It should be obvious that this 
response is blatantly question begging. It's based on the left-hand side 
of the biconditional given in (6). Since Davidson provides an analysis of 
this he should employ his analysis in answering the metaphysical 
question. I want to argue that Davidson doesn't in fact provide a non- 
question begging answer to the metaphysical question, that his account 
fails to support counterfactuals like (1). The principal worry is similar 
to one voiced by Stoutland 12 _ that there is an insufficient connection 
between the justificatory and causal relations. The present argument is 
more focused than Stoutland's in that it shows how in particular the 
connection is insufficient, i.e., because it fails to support the appropriate 
sorts of counterfactuals and subjunctive conditionals)3 
Let's begin with the justificatory relation that is specified in the first 
conjunct of the biconditional given in (5). Justification is normative in 
that the given act-token must be reasonable in light of the agent's beliefs 
and desires. But the justificatory relation won't support counteffactuals 
like (1). Remember, it is essential to Davidson's base distinction in 
"Actions, Reasons, and Causes", between a mere reason and reasons 
for which, that the semantic content of the relevant propositional 
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attitudes alone, while providing a necessary condition for the produc- 
tion of a given intentional action, isn't a sufficient one. It isn't enough 
that we have as a conclusion of some practical inference an uncondi- 
tional evaluative proposition concerning the reasonableness of the given 
act-token. On Davidson's account, the justificatory relation; by itself, is 
incapable of supporting counterfactuals like (1). 
A primary reason must, in addition, be the cause of the intentional 
action. The constituent belief state and pro-attitude must be token 
identical with a physical event Pl (R --t pl) which causes physical event 
P2 which is, itself, token identical with the appropriate intentional action 
(A =t P2). On Davidson's analysis, we have the following singular causal 
statement nomically subsumed by some strict physical law: 
(9) p~ caused& 
which supports the following counterfactual: 
(10) If p~ hadn't obtained, then P2 wouldn't have obtained. 
Davidson isn't home yet. From the counterfactual given in (10) he must 
derive (1). But in order to do so there must be some relation R* 
between the propositional attitudes mentioned in (1) and the physical 
events occuring in (9) and (10). If there is no relation whatsoever 
between the contentful mental events and the appropriate physical 
events, then there's no way to get from (10) to (1). 
On Davidson's account however, there is some relation, namely 
token identity. He claims that an event-token of a given intentional type 
is identical with an event-token of a given physical type. Is token 
identity sufficient to insure the above inference? It's important to note 
that token identity is modally flaccid since the event-token only 
contingently exemplifies the given mental type. It's, in effect, a relation 
that occurs within a world. In a given causally possible world w R =t p~. 
But the token identity that holds between R and Pl won't hold up when 
you move across causally possible worlds. Token identity is a con- 
tingent relation. It is contingent in virtue of the fact that the mental or 
intentiOnal type used to pick out the event-token is only contingently 
instantiated in that event-token. Why is this important? Well it seems 
that, in order to get from (10) to (1), the relation R* between R and Pl 
and A and P2 respectively must be a modal relation. R* must itself be 
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able to support the appropriate sorts of counterfactuals and subjunctive 
conditionals. 
To see this, let's assume the opposite. Let's assume that R* can be a 
contingent relation like token identity and can support counterfactuals 
like (1). Consider the following causally possible worlds: 
wl " (Pl causes P2) and (R*(pl, R ) and R*(p2, A)) 
w2 " (Pl causes P2) and ( - R * ( p l ,  R ) and R*(P2, A)) 
w 3 9 pl and P2 don't  obtain. 
w 1 is stipulated by induction hypothesis, w 1 being the actual world in 
the model. Since R* is a contingent relation, p~ and R won't be so 
related in all the nearby worlds. Thus there is a nearby causally possible 
world w z where Pl won't bear R* to R while P2 bears R* to A. If Pl and 
P2 are contingent physical events, there must be some world w 3 where 
P2 fails to obtain because pl one does given the counterfactual in (10). 
Remember  we assumed that the contingent R* would support counter- 
factuals and subjunctive conditionals like (1). But such a counterfactual 
will fail in the given model because of nearby worlds like w2, thus 
deriving a contradiction. Thus R* can't be a contingent relation. 
One might object as follows. Look, you've only considered the 
physical counterfactuals and token identity. The justificatory relation, 
though incapable by itself of supporting counterfactuals and subjunctive 
conditionals, will nevertheless impose an important restriction once 
the counterfactual situation has been stipulated. Specifically, since A 
occured there must be an appropriate belief-desire pair such that they 
have as their conclusion in a piece of practical reasoning the proposi- 
tional content expressed by A --  or else A simply isn't an intentional 
action, ff it turns out that, given the justificatory relation, the proposi- 
tional content expressed by A will determine a particular primary 
reason R, then worlds like w 2 aren't a clear cut counterexample since 
there is no R whose content will have as a conclusion the unconditional 
evaluative proposition expressed by A. 
This objection is far too quick. Let's assume that, given the justifica- 
tory relation and the unconditional evaluative proposition expressed by 
A, we can indeed specify the primary reason R. It's simply false that A 
fails to be an intentional action at w2. In this case we have at w 2 a case 
of causal overdeterminati0n w R ---, P3 at w2 where P3 as well as Pl 
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cause P2. Even so, it's just not the case that the justificatory relation plus 
the unconditional evaluative proposition will determine the content of a 
specific primary reason. From this act of drinking a shot of whiskey 
being reasonable or good you can derive neither the content of the 
pro-attitude that any act is desirable in so far as it will soothe the 
agent's nerves --  nor the content of the belief state -- that this act of 
drinking a shot of whiskey will soothe the agent's nerves. The objection 
just seems to be a non-starter. 
One might further object that I'm asking the wrong question. Look, 
the interpretive schema in accordance with the principle of charity gives 
us causally efficacious rationalizing explanations. It's not clear that we 
take the physical event Pl such that R =t Pl in the actual world to the 
appropriate counterfactual situation. We want to ask of R -- if R had 
not occured would A have? Remember, however, our original question 
was metaphysical -- in virtue of what does the modal force of ration- 
alizing explanations hold? The principle of charity and the subsequent 
interpretive schema may give you epistemological access to the appro- 
priate rationalizing explanations, but it's not in virtue of the interpretive 
schema that these rationalizing explanations support counterfactuals. 
Davidson has provided an analysis of rationalizing explanations that 
purports to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the explanatory 
relation. If it's not in virtue of this analysis, I simply don't know how to 
make sense of Davidson's talk of oblique causation and token identity. 
It just strikes me that this response is either question begging, since it 
fails to restrict itself to the right-hand side of the biconditional, or a bad 
reading of Davidson, confusing as it does metaphysical and epistemo- 
logical issues. 
Why can't someone take the following line. Look, you presuppose a 
certain notion of causal relevance and it's in virtue of this notion --  that 
causally relevant properties should support the appropriate sorts of 
counterfactuals --  that your argument rims. Why should Davidson buy 
into this notion of causal relevance? Why can't it be the case that it 
simply doesn't matter that Davidson can't secure counterfactuals like 
(1) since that's just how mental properties are causally efficacious? A 
mental event has the patterns of causal interaction that it does in virtue 
of the fact that the given event exemplifies a physical type correspond- 
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ing to some nomologically subsumptive description. Perhaps that's just 
what makes mental causation distinctively mental. 
Besides the obvious concessionary tone of such a reply, there's 
reason to think that Davidson can't adopt such a line. One prominent 
lacuna in Davidson's account of rationalizing explanations is the 
problem of wayward or deviant causal chains. Consider the case of a 
mountain climber supporting his partner with a rope. He believes that 
this puts himself in a dangerous position and that loosening his hold on 
the rope would relieve him of the weight and the danger. These 
thoughts so unnerve the climber as to cause him to loosen his hold. 
Thus the relevant propositional attitudes, though a cause of the letting 
go of the rope, didn't cause the action in the appropriate way. Davidson 
writes that 14 
Beliefs and desires that would rationalize an action if they caused it in the right way -- 
through a course of practical reasoning -- may cause it in other ways. 
A coordinated belief-desire complex will cause a given action in the 
appropriate way just in case it was in virtue of a piece of practical 
reasoning. But that's just to say that content must be causally relevant in 
my sense. Davidson will never provide an adequate resolution to the 
problem of wayward or deviant causal chains without first addressing 
the metaphysical question --  without first demonstrating how content 
can meet the necessary condition on causal relevance as specified in 
(3)) 5 In fact it's not clear to me that one can even formulate the 
problem without at least tacitly presupposing this notion of causal 
relevance. The problem simply is that the reason for an action isn't 
causing it in the "right" way. What can appropriateness consist in other 
than the causal relevance of content? 
It's clear that R* must be a modal relation capable of itself support- 
ing counterfactuals and subjunctive conditionals. It is sufficient that 
statements like: 
(11) 9 b) 
should come out true. Davidson thus can't use weak supervenience 
since weak supervenience only holds within a given world w. In 
adopting modal R*, however, one doesn't give up token identity since it 
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will be trivially implied. At any world w R =, p, for some physical event 
p. Thus Davidson's picture of the relationship of the mental to the 
physical, while failing to be a sufficient one, may well turn out to be a 
necessary one. 
Would strong supervenience be sufficient to preserve the modal 
force of our vernacular belief-desire explanations? Consider then, 
property supervenience) 6 The mental will strongly supervene on the 
physical if and only if no two possible events instantiate the same 
physical properties while differing with respect to some mental 
property. Let P be the maximal physical property of a given agent, and 
let M be some mental property. If M strongly supervenes on P, then P 




[](VX) (Pl(X) -* R(x)) 
[] (Yx) (P2(x) --" A(x)) 
Where x ranges over individual, R is the predicate "is a primary reason 
R", A "is the intentional action A", and P1, P2 are predicates expressing 
the maximal physical property of the given individual. P, however, fails 
to be a necessary condition for M because of its strength, P being the 
maximal physical property of the agent. We need a weaker superveni- 
ence base. A given property A is weaker than property B if and only if 
whenever B exemplified A is, but not conversely. A property P'  is a 
minimal physical base property just in case there is no weaker property 
which is causally sufficient for M. A supervenience thesis with/'1 as the 
supervenience base will thus provide causally necessary and sufficient 
conditions for M. 
Kim, in 'Psyschophysical Supervenience as Mind-Body Theory', has 
shown that strong supervenience is compatible with Fodor's multiple 
realizability argument. 17 Multiple Realizability is the idea that a given 
macro-property can be realized by various micro-structures. Strong 
supervenience will allow for possibly infinite alternative minimal 
physical bases for a given mental property. Thus we have: 
cO 
(14)  9  ~ V p. 
i = l  
E P I P H E N O M E N A L I S M  A N D  C O N T E N T  85 
There may of course be some relatively simple higher order physical 
property P* corresponding to V~176 P. Switching to talk of events we 
have: 
(15) 9 (R(x) ~ P*(x)) 
and 
(16) 9 (A(x) *- P~(x)) 
where x ranges over events and P•, P~ are predicates expressing the 
appropriate higher order physical properties. From (15), (16) and 
(17) [] (Vx) ( -P*(x )  -~ -P*(x) )  ~8 
we can derive counterfactuals like (1). 
Despite the fact that (14) gives us'necessary coextension between the 
supervenient mental properties and the base physical properties, it's not 
prima facie clear that this will insure the existence of psycho-physical 
bridge laws. As Fodor has pointed out, Boolean operations on the 
natural kinds of a given science may fail to preserve nomological 
force) 9 But Fodor never really provides an argument for this, and the 
suggestion may well turn out to be false. Even if it does pan out, even 
if Boolean operations really do fail to preserve nomological force, 
Davidson still might not be happy with this. Even though psycho- 
physical laws fail, multiple realizability is a much weaker reason for 
denying such laws than the Anomaly of the Mental. Davidson argues 
that psycho-physical laws fail because there's a categorical difference 
between mental and physical concepts. The former have rational con- 
ditions of application while the latter have non-rational conditions 
of application. Remember, a minimal physical base will be causally 
sufficient for some mental event. Strong supervenience effectively 
blurs the categorical difference between the mental and the physical, 
resulting, as it does, in a form of reductionism. With mutilple 
realizability you fix a token of a mental event and ask what various 
physical types it must be in order to exemplify the given mental type. 
Davidson, on the other hand, wants to fix the physical state of the agent 
and ask what various mental types he could exemplify. If Anomaly 
holds, no physical property will ever be cansally sufficient for a mental 
property's instantiation. 
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Strong supervenience, while sufficient for insuring the modal force of 
our folk psychological explanations, seems to be too strong for 
Davidson's purposes. Perhaps there's some other candidate for modal 
R*. The problem is that if R* is a modal relation of the appropriate 
sort, we'll get necessary coextension. It's not clear to me how to clear 
out some kind of metaphysical middle ground --  perhaps if one could 
find some restriction on the relevant possible worlds in evaluating 
counterfactuals through the use of the appropriate ceteris paribus 
clauses. All that would be required would be for the supervenience 
relation to hold in all accessible worlds. But I have no idea how to flesh 
out this suggestion since I don't  know how to provide a non-ad hoc 
restriction for the ceteris paribus clause. I don't  have an argument, but I 
suspect the relation required by Davidson may turn out to be meta- 
physically incoherent. Davidson's understanding of supervenience is 
based on a confusion --  a confusion which made the supervenience 
relation so initially attractive. It was thought that supervenience could 
give one a counterfactual dependency relation without any correspond- 
ing reduction. Unfortunately, weak supervenience won't support the 
appropriate counterfactuals and strong supervenience gives way to 
type-type connections. 
STRICT PHYSICALIST CAUSATION 
Physicalism, which has served as the basic ontological framework as 
well as a methodological constraint in reaction to dualism for most of 
the recent work in the philosophy of mind, has very naturally influ- 
enced and constrained people's thoughts concerning psycho-physical 
causation. The general strategy has been to somehow construe psycho- 
physical causation as a species of physical-physical causation. I want to 
suggest that we reexamine the kind of constraint that our adherence to 
strict physicalist causation has put on providing an account of the 
causal efficacy of propositional attitudes. I believe that such a strict 
physicalist notion of causation has had its philosophical costs for 
Davidson's account --it is precisely this which makes his notion of the 
mental epiphenomenal. I think that more flexibility on this count may 
give content theorists more room to manoeuver and may open some 
interesting philosophical alternatives. 
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So what exactly is strict physicalist causation? Intuitively, one can 
think of it as the doctrine that physical theory determines the range of 
causal possibility. One can see this most clearly in Davidson's Principle 
of the Nomological Character of Causality. Recall that Davidson holds 
the neo-Humean view that all causal relations must be nomologically 
subsumed by strict laws. Thus the complete specification of these strict 
laws will also completely specify the range of causal possibility, i.e., it 
will specify whatever is causally possible. Unfortunately it is unclear 
what exactly Davidson meant by restricting the nomic subsumption of 
singular causal statements to strict laws.  z~ Despite the exegetical 
difficulties connected with this, Davidson explicitly requires that any 
system of strict laws have the properties of closure and comprehensive- 
ness. Presumably these restrictions are there to insure that Davidson 
has completely captured all species of causal relations. None of this so 
far is what is causing problems. Rather, it is Davidson's intuitive and 
admittedly plausible claim that such strict laws are physical laws. 
Despite the prima facie plausibility and attractiveness of this move, that 
strict laws are only physical laws isn't the only logically possibility. It 
may turn out that there is some other system of laws that satisfy the 
closure and comprehensiveness constraint. Davidson's claim, however, 
goes unargued for. Davidson's account has the following property: since 
physical theory determines the range of causal possibility, and since the 
lawful descriptions instantiating these strict laws are presumably the 
appropriate micro-physical descriptions, all causal relations must satisfy 
the  micro-physical supervenience condition -- that all causal relations 
strongly supervene on the appropriate micro-physical states. The 
micro-physical supervenience condition is what makes strict physicalist 
causation strict physicalist causation. Rejection of the supervenience 
claim is tantamount to a rejection of strict physicalist causation. 
It is clear that on Davidson's account, the semantic content of 
propositional attitudes just can't be causally relevant. Given his strict 
physicalist notion of causation, in order for content to be causally 
relevant, it would have to strongly supervene on physical properties.. 
But given the Anomaly of the Mental which states that there is a 
categorical difference between mental and physical concepts (since 
mental concepts have rational conditions of application while physical 
concepts have non-rational conditions of applications) such a super- 
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venience claim would be repugnant. I'd like to suggest that a rejection 
of micro-physical supervenience with respect to causation might turn 
out to be a fruitful direction of research. I suspect that such a line will 
be the only way to provide an autonomist account of content. 
Providing an account of physicalist causation which rejects the 
micro-physical supervenience condition is not an easy matter however. 
One immediately faces the following dilemma. Maintaining the strong 
supervenience condition is problematic for the autonomist as we have 
seen. However, if one substitutes weak supervenience for strong, 
physical theory won't determine the range of causal possibility, and it 
would seem that we no longer have an interesting physicalist notion of 
causation. 
N a r r o w  is t h e  g a t e  . . . .  2~ 
N O T E S  
Cf. Jaegwon Kim: 1985, 'Concepts of Supervenience', Philosophy and Phenomeno- 
logical Research 45, pp. 153--177. Weak supervenience is defined as follows: 
A weakly supervenes on B ** [3(VF ~ A) I(Vx)(F(x) --" (3G ~ B) 
(B(x) A (Vy)(G(y) - '  r(y)))] 
where A and B are sets of properties. Kim leaves the interpretation of the modality 
unspecified since different modalities may be appropriate for different contexts. Strong 
supervenience differs from weak in that it requires an additional modal operator: 
A strongly supervenes on B ** VI(VF ~ A)[(Vx)(F(x) --' (3G ~ B) 
(B(x) A [3(Vy)(G(y) ~ r(y)))l.  
2 Cf. David Lewis' discussion of epiphenomena in: 1973, 'Causation', Journal of 
Philosophy 70, pp. 556--567. 
3 For example, similar problems should arise for Tyler Burge's account of the explana- 
tory role of content in: 1986, 'Individualism and Psychology', The Philosophical 
Review, pp. 3--45. 
4 In 1982, Essays on Actions and Events (Clarendon Press, Oxford), pp. 3--19. 
5 Cf. 'The Explanatory Role of Content', forthcoming. 
6 Explanation is an epistemic notion. Explanations are given to engender under- 
standing. When we need an explanation we are in some sort of epistemic predicament 
(what Sylvain Bromberger calls a "p-predicament" or "b-predicament" --  cf. 1965. 'An 
Approach to Explanation', Analytic Philosophy (Basil Blackwell, Oxford)). A given 
explanation will be adequate, then, only if it resolves the tension inherent in such an 
epistemic situation. It would be interesting to more clearly specify the epistemological 
value of counterfactuals, i.e., their role in resolving our epistemic predicament. 
7 Cf. Ernest Lepore and Brian McLaughlin: 1985, 'Actions, Reasons, Causes, and 
Intentions', and Michael Bratman: 1985, 'Davidson's Theory of Intention', Actions and 
Events (Basil Blaekwell, New York), pp. 3--13 and 14--28 respectively. 
8 Davidson writes: "If someone performs an action of type A with the intention of 
performing an  action of type B, then he must have a pro-attitude towards actions of 
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type B . . .  and a belief that in performing an action of type A will b e . . .  performing an 
action of type B . . . .  The expression of the belief and desire entail that actions of type 
A are, or probably will be, good . . . .  The descriptions of the action provided by the 
phrase substituted for 'A'  gives the description under which the desire and belief 
rationalize the action." 
In 1982, 'Intending', Essays on Actions and Events, pp. 86--87. 
9 Ibid.,pp. 83--102. 
~0 In Essays on Actions and Events, pp. 207--225. Cf. also Brian McLaughlin: 1985, 
'Anomalous Monism and the Irreducibility of the Mental', Actions and Events, pp. 
331--367. 
I I Cf. Carl G. Hempel: 1965, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (The Free Press, New 
York). 
~2 1980,'Oblique Causation and Reasons for Action', Synthese 43, pp. 351--367. 
~3 The following has been inspired by Loewer and Lepore's criticism of Dual Aspect 
Semantics ('Dual Aspect Semantics', forthcoming) and Dretske's recent reductionist 
account of content ('Misrepresentation', 'The Explanatory Role of Content', and 
'Explaining Behavior', forthcoming). 
14 1982, 'Freedom to Act', Essays on Actions and Events, p. 79. 
5 I owe this point to Barry Loewer. 
16 Cf. Jaegwon Kim: 1985, 'Concepts of Supervenience', op. cit., 1979, 'Causality, 
Identity, and Supervenlence', Midwest Studies 4, pp. 31--49, and 1984, 'Epiphenomenal 
and Supervenient Causation', Midwest Studies 9, pp 257--270. 
~7 1982, Brain and Cognitive Theory. Cf. also Jerry Fodor, 1975, chapter 1 of The 
Language of Thought (Harvard University Press, Cambridge). 
~8 This is, of course, question begging with respect to the Problem of Spurious 
Overdetermination, but is, nevertheless, sufficient for expository purposes. A more 
satisfactory account would take greater care in specifying the appropriate ceteris 
paribus clauses for Dretske's counterfactual condition. 
Although having the content of the agent's propositional attitudes strongly super- 
vene on the physical states and events of the agent's body is sufficient to capture 
Dretske's counterfactual condition, it is important to emphasize that securing the 
appropriate counterfactuals and subjunctive conditionals is only a necessary condition 
on causal relevance. It's not a sufficient condition. It isn't enough to establish some kind 
of counterfactual covariation between the intentional properties of a contentful mental 
event and its causally efficacious micro-physical properties in order to insure the causal 
relevance of the mental event's semantic content. If there's no causal chain between a 
primary reason R and an intentional action A independent of the causal chain between 
physical events Pl and P2, then what is to keep the causal powers of R from being pre- 
empted by pl? As Kim has argued ('Causality, Identity, and Supervenience'), strong 
supervenience may itself be compatible with a weak form of epiphenomenalism since 
the supervenience base is doing all the work in psycho-physical causation. 
It's not clear that Kim's weak epiphenomenalism is a stable position. One may be 
able to deploy the Problem of Pre-Emption in a general argument to the effect that 
Kim's position collapses into a form of eliminativism. 
~9 Cf. The Language of Thought. 
20 Cf. Brian McLaughlin's 'Anomalous Monism and the Irreducibility of the Mental'. 
21 In facL Barry Loewer suggests that the gate is closed. Nevertheless, my principal 
point remains good --  that if you want an autonomist notion of content that's not 
epiphenomenal, you had better reject strict physicalist causation. For instance, one 
could account for the causal relevance of content in terms of Lewis' counterfactual 
analysis of causation. 
In some unpublished notes Jaegwon Kim has independently developed a similar 
argument against Davidson. Kim's main criticism, like mine, is that while Davidson can 
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get the appropriate physical counterfactuals, he can't get counterfactuals in terms of the 
relevant intentional descriptions. Kim develops an interesting ancillary argument using 
the notion of "causal informativeness". A given description is causally informative if it is 
similar to or in the "vicinity" of descriptions in terms of which the relevant subsumptive 
nomic generalization is stated. A singular causal statement will be explanatory if it is 
given in terms of causally informative descriptions. Thus the following singular causal 
statement: 
(A) The event reported on page 1 of The Times caused the event reported on 
page 3 of The Herald. 
fails to be explanatory since it fails to be causally informative. Kim's argument takes the 
form of a challenge --  given that there are no type-type connections between mental 
and physical descriptions, how is it that rationalizing explanations are any different 
from the causally uninformative singular causal statement (A)? 
I would like to thank Paul Boghosian, Don Demetriades, Jaegwon Kim, Barry 
Loewcr, Dion Scott-Kakures, Brian McLaughlin, Sigrun Svavarsdottir, and Bill Tascheck 
for helpful criticism and comments. And special thanks to A B Carter and Gary Ebbs 
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